This is my classic paper, written in early 1984, concerning existence and optimality in general financial equilibrium with incomplete markets for nominal assets, just now being published in a special issue of the Journal of Mathematical Economics.
I. Introduction
This paper presents a fairly general theory of competitive equilibrium when, in effect, trading across contingent commodities markets is constrained. The novel feature of my formulation is its representation of such an incomplete market structure as a purely financial phenomenon; trading is constrained simply because there are insufficient contingent claims instruments to provide households with all potentially desirable credit arrangements. Put succinctly, then, my investigation pursues the implications of "incomplete" markets following Arrow's [1] rather than Debreu's [3, Chapter 7] lead.
In the next section I describe the basic model (which is unfortunately, if unavoidably, quite notation intensive). The most crucial characteristic of this model is the restriction on rates of return to various financial instruments imposed by simple arbitrage considerations. Relying heavily on this restriction, in Sections III and IV I establish fundamental results concerning existence and optimality. Regarding existence, my main contribution is a theorem whose hypotheses are comparable in generality to those employed in standard Walrasian theory. In particular, in contrast to the (Debreuvian) approach taken in the deservedly influential paper of Radner [10] , my (Arrovian) approach yields equilibrium without the artifice of introducing arbitrary (and, should I also say, self-contradictory?) bounds on presumed competitive behavior. On the other hand, with respect to optimality, my sole contribution is a refinement of the clever characterization due to Grossman [6] (and erected on foundations provided earlier by the insightful studies of Diamond [4] and Hart [7] ). This patently severe qualification to the two basic theorems of welfare emphasizes that, with incomplete financial markets, competitive allocation is Pareto optimal only relative to a very narrow class of transaction-constrained perturbations.
Finally, in the concluding section I briefly discuss extensions of two different sorts -first, generalizations involving (for example) weaker hypotheses on household characteristics (in the spirit, say, of McKenzie [8] ), and second, generalizations involving (for example) broader specification of financial instruments (in the spirit, say, of Hart [7] or, better, Gale [5] ). This last analysis suggests one effective treatment for the inherent difficulty associated with endogenous rates of return (a difficulty which was also skillfully diagnosed in Hart's fine piece).
II. The Model
To avoid obscuring my presentation with inessential technical detail, I consider pure distribution within the simplest possible intertemporal context, where there are only two periods, today and tomorrow, denoted by the superscripts 0 and 1, respectively. There is a priori uncertainty about which of σ possible states of the world will prevail tomorrow; these are denoted by the superscripts s ∈ S = {1, 2, ..., σ}. In today's spot market, households can buy and sell -within the limits of their predetermined endowment income -either goods, which they consume, or bonds, which they hold until redeemed next period. Then, in tomorrow's spot market, they can again buy and sell goods -but now within the limits of their realized endowment cum portfolio income -which they also consume. Since all transactions take place on spot markets, both prices (for goods and bonds) and returns (on bonds) are denominated in the unit of account, say, dollars.
Before making this general framework more specific, I should first emphasize that there are only two differences between Arrow's and my version of contingent claims markets: First, there are typically fewer available (types of) bonds than potential states, and second, each bond normally yields returns in several states. Thus, in the limiting case, there may be only a single available bond which yields returns in every state, for example, money (or, more precisely, inside money).
Economic Objects
There are κ physical commodities or goods, denoted by the superscript c ∈ C = {1, 2, ..., κ}. Quantities of goods are represented by x 0c and x 1sc , or x 0 = (x 01 , x 02 , . . . , x 0κ ) and x 1s = (x 1s1 , x 1s2 , . . . , x 1sκ ), or x = (x 0 , x 11 , x 12 , . . . , x 1σ ). Similarly, spot prices of goods are represented by p 0c and p 1sc , or p 0 = (p 01 , p 02 , . . . , p 0κ ) and p 1s = (p 1s1 , p 1s2 , . . . , p 1sκ ), or p = (p 0 , p 11 , p 12 , . . . , p 1σ ). There are also ι financial instruments or bonds, denoted by the superscript i ∈ I = {1, 2, ..., ι}. Quantities of bonds are represented by
The i th bond is a commitment to pay (in tomorrow's spot market) P is dollars if state s occurs. I will assume throughout the paper that there are no more bonds than states,
and, for the most part, that returns are both nonnegative and nontrivial,
While my analysis therefore also covers the polar case where there may be complete markets (ι = σ), I will be mainly concerned with the less well understood case where there aren't (ι < σ).
Household Behavior
There are η active agents or households, denoted by the subscript h ∈ H = {1, 2, ..., η}. Each household has an endowment of goods, represented by the vector ω h = (ω 0 h , ω 11 h , ω 12 h , . . . , ω 1σ h ), and preferences over goods, represented by the function u h : R κ(σ+1) + → R. For the bulk of my analysis I will assume that endowments are strictly positive, i.e., that
1 I adopt the generally accepted convention that, for any pair of vectors, say, y 0 ∈ R n and y 00 ∈ R n , y 0 = y 00 means y j0 = y j00 for every j, y 0 > y 00 means y j0 = y j00 for every j, with strict inequality for some j, while y 0 À y 00 means y j0 > y j00 for every j.
and that preferences are continuous, weakly monotone in each of the potential consumption bundles x 0 h and x 1s h for s ∈ S, and quasi-concave, i.e., in particular, that
Given spot prices (p, ψ), each household chooses its consumption plan x h and portfolio holdings β h so as to maximize its utility subject to (spot market) budget constraints, i.e., so that (x h , β h ) is an optimal solution to the problem
h for s ∈ S,
for h ∈ H. Notice especially that each household is thus free to buy or sell -within the limits of its budget constraints, of course -any quantity of bonds; if β i h > 0, then it is a creditor, while if β i h < 0, it is a debtor (with regard to the particular bond i).
Arbitrage Possibilities
The key to my analysis is the fact that the assumptions (2) and (4) together with the behavior described in (5) entail a severe restriction on the configuration of bond prices and their returns (which may prevail in competitive equilibrium). This can be most clearly seen by proceeding in several steps.
(i) Bond prices are strictly positive,
Otherwise, if ψ i 5 0 for some i, every household would want to buy unbounded amounts of this bond today, and thereby attain the prospect of unlimited consumption in some state s (for which P is > 0) tomorrow.
From this first observation it follows that, by defining
for h ∈ H, i ∈ I and r is ≡ P is /ψ i = rate of return to bond i in state s for s ∈ S, i ∈ I, we can streamline the description of household behavior by reformulating (5) in terms of choosing (x h , b h ) to be an optimal solution to the problem
for h ∈ H. Note also that, in switching from returns to rates of return (given (6)), (2) becomes
The important advantage of this reformulation stems from a second basic observation.
(ii) There are "no fast bucks,"
Otherwise, if (− (9) amounts to the analogue for finance of the familiar "no free lunch" postulate for production (explaining my choice of terminology). For my purposes it has an extremely useful restatement, whose full proof is fairly lengthy and therefore deferred to the Appendix. Lemma 1. There are "no fast bucks", condition (9) , if and only if there are some positive values for wealth in each state, ψ s > 0 for s ∈ S, such that the value of each bond's returns equals its price,
These values can be interpreted as the prices associated with σ Arrow securitieswhere the return from the s th such security is one dollar if state s occurs, and nothing otherwise, and where, for example, the set of returns generated by varying a portfolio consisting of one dollar's worth of these securities contains the set generated by varying one dollar's worth of the original bonds. In other words, when ι < σ, Lemma 1 means that investing in the original bonds is tantamount to investing (subject to some additional linear constraints) in Arrow-Debreu securities. (Precisely, in dollar terms, a particular portfolio of original bonds b 0 is equivalent to the portfolio of Arrow-Debreu se-
A fortiori, when ι = σ -and the rates of return r i for i ∈ I are linearly independent -the two investment opportunities are identical. 2 One final observation permits adopting an especially convenient normalization for the spot market prices of goods and rates of return on bonds.
(iii) Goods prices are nonnegative and nontrivial in each spot market,
Otherwise, for example, if p 0c < 0 for some c or p 0 = 0, every household would want to attain unlimited consumption today.
By virtue of the fact that each budget constraint in (7) is unaffected upon being multiplied through by a positive constant, (10) and (11) enable me to concentrate attention on prices and rates of return satisfying p ∈ P = {p:p = 0 and
and r ∈ R = {r : r
respectively, where it will be very useful in the sequel to represent the whole array of rates of return by the (ι × σ) -dimensional matrix
(Formally, given p satisfying (11) and r satisfying both (8) and (9) -and hence also (10) for some ψ s > 0 for s ∈ S -we can transform into p 0 ∈ P and r 0 ∈ R using the formulas
respectively. This maneuver is completed by transforming
An attentive reader may have noticed that in going from the formulation (5) to (7), and then from the parameters (p, r) to (p 0 , r 0 ) ∈ P × R, we have lost track of some of the original structure of the model. In particular, it might appear as if we need to account for which subset of R corresponds to the original specification of returns. This turns out, however, not to be a relevant consideration; both my existence results and my optimality characterization are stated in terms of an arbitrary element of R -and, from the preceding argument, we now know that any configuration of bond prices and their returns which may prevail in competitive equilibrium must yield some r ∈ R. 3 
Financial Equilibrium
Let x = (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x η ) represent a goods allocation, and b = (b 1 , b 2 , . . . , b η ) represent bond holdings (after today's trading). Then, on the one hand, an allocation x is feasible if it is nonnegative, x = 0, and -assuming free disposal of unwanted goodsmaterials balance,
and
On the other hand, it is Pareto optimal if there is no other feasible allocation x 0 which dominates x in terms of utility,
with strict inequality for some h.
Finally, given permissible rates of return r ∈ R, a price-allocation-holding triplet
is a financial equilibrium if, at the normalized prices p ∈ P , each household maximizes, (x h , b h ) is an optimal solution to the problem (7) for h ∈ H, and each market clears,
In analyzing the properties of financial equilibrium it is possible (and all but indispensable) to restrict attention to rates of return which are linearly independent, r ∈ R ι = {r : r ∈ R and rank r = ι} = {r : r ∈ R and if b ∈ R ι and
The last two identities in (15) follow directly from (9) and Lemma 1, and, in particular, the former provides explicit justification for my asserting that such an additional requirement involves no real loss of generality; otherwise, if (−
some b 0 6 = 0, households would be indifferent between having access to the original set of bonds and to any maximal subset yielding independent rates of return. (For elaboration of these points, see Cass-Stiglitz [2] , especially pp. 149-150.) The usefulness of imposing (15) comes (in part) from the easily verified result that together with weak monotonicity (4) -which itself implies that, at an optimal solution, each budget constraint in (7) holds with equality -it implies that, in a financial equilibrium, market clearing (14) is equivalent to materials balance (12). 4 In other words, by assuming that rates of return are linearly independent, we can essentially ignore the bond markets per se. But, as we shall see shortly, (15) also affords several other substantial benefits.
III. Existence of Financial Equilibrium

The Existence Theorem
One of the two main results in this paper is the sine qua non for any model of competitive equilibrium, an existence proof. My basic argument takes a well-known direction (that pioneered by Arrow and Debreu [see, especially, Debreu 3, Chapter 5]). However, it deviates a bit from the usual route by deliberately concealing the role of bond prices in order to avoid difficulties with demand irregularities. For this reason I present it in some (but, I hope, not excessive) detail. Theorem 1. Given the maintained assumptions about households' endowments and preferences, there is a financial equilibrium (p, x, b) corresponding to every return structure r ∈ R ι . 4 Obviously, (14) implies (12). On the other side, (7) and (12) 
for s ∈ S. These inequalities in turn imply (from the last expression in (15) with
clearing for bonds, and hence (again from (12)), market clearing for goods.
Proof of Theorem 1. Pick a bound X h ω h <<x << ∞ and define the sets
for ε > 0, and
Now consider the equilibrium model obtained from the original model when the optimal solutions to (7) are replaced by the optimal solutions to the problem
together with the identity
b h for h = 1, and by the optimal solutions to the
for h > 1. Then my proof involves establishing the following series of claims.
(i) The set of optimal solutions to (16), say, x 1 (p), is well-defined (i.e., nonempty and compact-valued), convex-valued and upper semi-continuous for p ∈ P . Moreover, (constrained) consumption demand satisfies (the corresponding weak form of) Walras' law, px 1 5 pω 1 , with equality if
Finally, if x 1 ∈ x 1 (p) and x 1 <<x, then x 1 is also an optimal solution to the problem
The set of optimal solutions to (17), say, (x h (p, r), b h (p, r)), is equally well-behaved for (p, r) ∈ P ε × R ι , for every ε > 0.
Given my assumptions on ω h and u h , these results are well-established for the problems (16) and (19). For the problems (17) and (7), they follow from exactly parallel sorts of reasoning, once it is established that the constraint set in (17) is compact -as I will demonstrate in the Appendix.
Lemma 2a: The correspondence (x h (p, r), b h (p, r)) is well-defined, convex-valued, and upper semi-continuous on P ε × R ι , for ε > 0. Moreover, (constrained) consumptionportfolio demand satisfies the various (corresponding weak) forms of Walras' law
r is b i h for s ∈ S, and px h 5 pω h ,
(20) r) ) and x h <<x, then (x h , b h ) is also an optimal solution to (7).
(ii) Given r ∈ R ι , if (p, x, b) is a financial equilibrium in this new model (where (7) has been replaced by (16) for h = 1 and by (17) for h > 1), then it is also a financial equilibrium in the original model.
Materials balance (12) implies that x h 5
X h ω h <<x for h ∈ H. So all that needs to be shown is that if x 1 is an optimal solution to (19) and
is an optimal solution to (7) for h = 1.
Since r ∈ R ι ⊂ R, adding up the budget constraints in (7) for h = 1 yields the budget constraint in (19).
p
for s ∈ S. Hence, (x 1 , b 1 ) is a feasible solution, and thus necessarily also an optimal solution to (7) for h = 1.
(iii) Given r ∈ R ι , the correspondence φ ε : P ε × X ⇒ P ε × X defined by
and x → {p 0 : p 0 is an optimal solution to the problem max
This result follows from a standard argument based on the regularity properties asserted in (i) above, and employing Kakutani's Theorem.
(iv) Given r ∈ R ι , if ε is sufficiently small, then a fixed point (p * , x * ) ∈ φ ε (p * , x * ) yields a financial equilibrium (p, x, b), where p = p * , x = x * and (x h , b h ) is an optimal solution to (7) with p = p * for h ∈ H.
This result too follows from a common sort of argument, but now based, in particular, on Walras' laws (18) and (20) and the weak monotonicity assumption on u 1 . I therefore forego a detailed demonstration (in a small, but well intentioned attempt to conserve length).¥ As I have already mentioned in the introduction, the principal virtue of this theorem is that it replaces ad hoc bounds on trades in (fixed combinations of) contingent commodities (as in Hart's argument, pursuing Radner's approach) by economically meaningful restrictions on (permissible configurations of) prices of and returns to contingent claims (culminating in the requirement described by (15)). One might legitimately raise the objection that, while my formulation may encompass some forms of financial instruments (e.g., money or fixed-term bonds), others have returns which are better conceived as being determined endogenously (e.g., stocks or commodity futures), and are therefore not covered by the model. I will return to this question in Section V, where I will outline, inter alia, how Theorem 1 can be utilized to analyze existence of financial equilibrium even under such a richer specification.
A "Stability" Result
The trick employed in establishing Theorem 1 easily enables me to derive an interesting result concerning the relation of financial equilibrium to rates of return. (I plan to illustrate its usefulness in forthcoming joint work with Martin Hellwig, in which we investigate the structure of the set of financial equilibria, especially as it pertains to the effects of extrinsic uncertainty in the present model). Let
) ∈ E(r) and x 1 is an optimal solution to (19)} for r ∈ R ι .
Theorem 2.Ẽ(r) is nonempty and upper semi-continuous for
Proof of Theorem 2. In the course of proving Theorem 1 I have already shown that E(r) 6 = ∅ for r ∈ R ι . So consider a sequence {r υ } such that r υ ∈ R ι for υ = 1 and lim υ→∞ r υ = r ∈ R ι with corresponding sequence
I only need to demonstrate that p ∈ P , that x is nonnegative and satisfies (12) (so that, a fortiori, x h <<x for h ∈ H), and that x 1 is an optimal solution to (9), while (x h , b h ) is an optimal solution to (7) for h > 1 (so that, a fortiori, (
is also an optimal solution to (7) for h = 1).
Since p υ ∈ P for υ = 1, obviously p ∈ P. Also, since x υ is nonnegative and satisfies (12) for υ = 1, obviously x is nonnegative and satisfies (12). Hence, since x 1 (p) is upper semi-continuous on p ∈ P , x 1 is an optimal solution to (19). Hence, by virtue of the weak monotonicity assumption on u 1 , p ∈ P ε for some 0 < ε < 1/(1 + σ). Hence, since (x h (p, r), b h (p, r)) is upper semi-continuous on, for example, P ε/2 × R ι , (x h , b h ) is an optimal solution to (7) for h > 1, and the proof is complete.¥
IV. Optimality of Financial Equilibrium
It is now widely understood that, when the market structure is incomplete, competitive allocation is, at best, Pareto optimal among a relatively small subset of feasible allocations. (See, especially, the basic papers I cited earlier, Hart [7] , Grossman [6] and Gale [5] .) In my formulation, this limitation can be seen very clearly by considering the following sorts of price transaction-constrained perturbations (in contrast to the quantity transaction-constrained perturbations which were natural in previous analyses of Radner-like models).
Given a particular feasible allocation, say,x, let
P 1s = {p 1s : p 1s > 0 and p 1s x 1s = p 1s ω 1s for x 1s ∈X 1s } for s ∈ S, and
where it will be convenient to let ω = (ω 0 , ω 11 , . . . , ω 1σ ) À 0 represent the total resources available to the economy (so that, with private ownership, ω =
given r ∈ R ι (and still givenx), define a type 0 perturbation to be a goods allocation x with the property that there are bond holdings b such that
for some p 1 ∈P 1 . Finally, define, for each state s, a type 1-s perturbation to be simply a goods allocation x with the property that
Thus, for example, a price vector p 1s ∈P 1s represents a support to the setX 1s (the potential resource bundles required in state s in order to improve upon just the consumption bundles received if state s occurs) at the point ω 1s = X hx 1s h (the actual resource bundle available in state s), while a type 1-s perturbation x represents a (feasible) allocation which differs fromx only in the consumption bundles which will be received if state s occurs.
The point of these definitions is that they allow a straightforward characterization of the optimality properties exhibited by financial equilibria. In particular, they yield an immediate analogue of the first basic theorem of welfare.
Theorem 3. Given r ∈ R ι , suppose that (p,x,b) is a financial equilibrium. Then p 1 ∈P 1 , andx is Pareto optimal among both type 0 and type 1-s perturbations (for p 1 =p 1 and s ∈ S, respectively).
Furthermore, and perhaps even more striking, they also yield a partial converse, the corresponding analogue of the second basic theorem of welfare. Theorem 4. Supposex À 0,x is feasible allocation, andx is Pareto optimal among both type 0 and type 1-s perturbations (for some r ∈ R ι and s ∈ S, respectively). Then there is ap ∈ P such that (p,x, 0) is a financial equilibrium given initial endowments ω h =x h for h ∈ H.
Remark. For this optimality characterization, it makes no fundamental difference whether rates of return are linearly independent, normalized, or even nonnegative. I have specified r ∈ R ι here merely because this again involves no real loss of generality (and also maintains consistency with my existence theorem).
Proof of Theorem 3. The argument is almost identical to Grossman's. Consider each of the asserted conclusions in turn.
Suppose otherwise, i.e.,p 1s / ∈P 1s for some s. Then there are x 1s h = 0 for h ∈ H such that u h (x 0 h , . . . , x 1s h , . . . ,x 1σ h ) = u h (x h ) for h ∈ H and (using goods market clearing in (14) and Walras' law (20)
and thus x 1s h = 0 for some h such that u h (x 0 h , . . . , x 1s h , . . . ,x 1σ h ) = u h (x h ) and
and thus (now using the weak monotonicity assumption on
But the last implication contradicts the hypothesis that (x h ,b h ) is an optimal solution to (7).
(ii)x is Pareto optimal among type 0 perturbations for p 1 =p 1 .
Suppose otherwise, i.e., there is a type 0 perturbation x 0 satisfying (13). Then (using Walras' law (20))
for h ∈ H, so that (using household maximization (7)) it must be the case that
But (25) (using bond market clearing in(14)) leads to the following contradiction of my initial supposition:
(iii)x is Pareto optimal among type 1-s perturbations for s ∈ S.
In this case an argument similar to that in (ii)
Proof of Theorem 4. The concluding step in this argument requires the following version of the familiar relationship between expenditure minimization and utility maximization; the essential idea of its proof is also briefly remarked in the Appendix.
) is an optimal solution to the problem
is also an optimal solution to (7).
The argument itself proceeds as follows:
Consider first type 1-s perturbations (24). The hypothesis thatx is Pareto optimal in this class of perturbations together with the weak monotonicity assumption on u h (in terms of x 1s h ) implies that ω 1s is a boundary point of the setX 1s for s ∈ S. Moreover, it is easily seen thatX 1s is also "disposable" (i.e., if x 1s ∈X 1s and x 1s0 = x 1s , then x 1s0 ∈X 1s ) and convex (using the quasi-concavity assumption on u h ) for s ∈ S. Hence, by the usual application of the supporting hyperplane theorem, the set of supportsP 1s is nonempty for s ∈ S, and hence the product of these setsP 1 is nonempty as well.
Consider next type 0 perturbations (23), given some p 1 ∈P 1 . Let z = (x 0 , z b ) and q = (q 0 , q b ) represent (κ +1) -dimensional vectors, and focus on the sets of such vectors defined bȳ
Then the hypothesis thatx is Pareto optimal among type 0 perturbations together with the weak monotonicity assumption on u h (now in terms of x 0 h ) implies that (ω 0 , 0) is a boundary point ofZ(p 1 ). Moreover, once again it is easily seen that this set is "disposable" and convex. Hence, as previously, the set of supportsQ(p 1 ) must be nonempty.
Sincex is hypothesized to be a feasible allocation, materials balance (12) is satisfied. So all that remains to be proven is that, given the hypothesis thatx À 0, and given some (p 0 , q b ) ∈Q(p 1 ) with p 1 ∈P 1 , one can constructp ∈ P such that (x h , 0) is an optimal solution to (7) with ω h =x h and p =p for h ∈ H. Arguing somewhat informally (in order to avoid too many "ε's" and "δ's"), this is established by the following series of results.
(i) q b > 0 (so that, without loss of generality, q b = 1).
Suppose otherwise, i.e., p 0 > 0 and q b = 0. Then (using r ∈ R ι and the continuity and weak monotonicity assumptions on u h ) we know that, for any h, increasing b i h for some i permits increasing x 1s h for some s, and thus decreasing x 0 h while (at least) maintaining u h . In other words, there is z ∈Z(p 1 ) such that
(ii) p 0 > 0.
Suppose otherwise, i.e., p 0 = 0 and q b = 1. Then since by derivation we have p 1s > 0 for s ∈ S, we know that, for any h, increasing x 0 h permits decreasing x 1s h for s ∈ S, and thus decreasing b i h for some i while again (at least) maintaining u h . In other words, there is z ∈Z(p 1 ) such that
(iii) (x h , 0) is an optimal solution to (26) with x h =x h , and therefore, by Lemma 2b, also an optimal solution to (7) for h ∈ H.
This result follows immediately from the facts established above (p 0 > 0 and q b = 1) upon considering the particular z ∈Z(p) generated by perturbating just
The argument is then completed simply by choosinḡ
I emphasize once again that the central thrust of this welfare characterization is -a point equally well stressed by Hart, Grossman and Gale -that incomplete markets inflict the invisible hand with almost terminal paralysis -contrary to plausible conjecturing based on Diamond's seminal example [4] . In fact, given my formulation in terms of financial markets, one can even construct examples in which there is only a single good and yet financial equilibria can be Pareto ranked; I leave this as an exercise for the interested reader.
V. Extensions
My basic approach is avowedly Walrasian: Households have full information (perfect foresight) and behave competitively (take prices as given no matter how large their contemplated transactions). Even within these confines, however, my results can be almost trivially extended in several important directions.
Multiple Periods
Introducing a (finite) number of future periods, say, τ , presents no fundamental analytical difficulty, though (as usual) it does entail horrendous notational complexity. The only point I would emphasize about this particular extension is that, in general, the model can still be cast in terms of one-period bonds. This follows from the observation that, if there are active resale markets, then (for example) one τ -period bond with prices ψ t−1s for s ∈ S t−1 and returns P ts for s ∈ S t , for 1 5 t 5 τ , must be equivalent to a sequence of τ one-period bonds with the same prices, and returns P ts + ψ ts for s ∈ S t , 1 5 t < τ and P ts for s ∈ S t , t = τ . (Here, of course, S t is an element of a partition S(t) of all possible states of the world S, and so on, à la mode de Debreu [3, Chapter 7] .)
Structural Interdependence
To my mind, one of the most fascinating outcomes of the Arrow-Debreu-McKenzie development of the solution to the equilibrium existence problem was the explicit recognition of the singular importance of some minimal commonality between households. This specific aspect of my model deserves further serious study (requiring subtle analysis of the interplay between endowments, preferences and financial opportunities). Without undertaking this intricate task myself, I can still say a bit more about weakening my strong assumption on endowments.
Let S + (r) = {s : s ∈ S and X i r is > 0} = the subset of states in which some return is positive (27) for r ∈ R ι . Then, careful scrutiny of the proofs of Theorems 1 and 4 (taking into account Lemma A2 in the Appendix) reveals that, in these arguments, strict positivity (3) could be replaced by the requirement that, say,
for h > 1. Presumably, (3 0 ) and (4) could be further weakened to some "irreducibility" condition (guaranteeing appropriately positive incomes, in the manner of McKenzie [8] ), but this remains to be seen.
Restricted Participation
Another extension of my analysis, and one which is very significant from an interpretive viewpoint -but also not too difficult from a mathematical viewpoint -is the imposition of institutional restrictions on trading activity in the bond markets. The broadest formulation of such restricted participation (which is, at the same time, relatively easy to handle; see, in particular, the second subsection in the Appendix) is the following: Assume that, in addition to budget constraints, households face the financial constraints b h ∈ B h ⊂ R ι for h ∈ H, where, say, (i) B h is a closed, convex set containing zero and (ii) − Such restrictions (and many more) have been extensively investigated in the finance literature, of course. But uncovering their implications within this particular model of a financial equilibrium seems to me a problem well worth deeper analysis in its own right.
Endogenous Returns
In "reality", the returns to many financial instruments (stocks, commodity futures, option contracts,...) depend on tomorrow's market conditions. Within my framework, this "fact" can be formalized by assuming that the rates of return to some subset of bonds, say, I 0 = {1, 2, ..., ι 0 } with ι 0 5 ι, are functions of tomorrow's spot prices or, even more generally, all spot prices, say, r i : P → {ρ : ρ ∈ R σ , ρ = 0 and X s ρ s = 1} for i ∈ I 0 .
It is relatively straightforward to verify that almost nothing in the foregoing analysis (of existence and optimality) is substantially affected by this generalization -provided that rates of return r = (r 1 (p), ..., r ι 0 (p), ..., r ι ) are continuous and satisfy the dimensionality condition r ∈ R ι (28)
for p ∈ P . The only real difficulty is that many "natural" specifications inherently lead to violations of this last requirement. (On this point I strongly recommend looking at Hart's careful analysis of a specific example in [7] .) However, such an unfortunate circumstance needn't raise an insurmountable obstacle to obtaining sensible results, at least not when r can be closely approximated by a continuous function, say, r δ with kr δ − rk < δ for p ∈ P, for δ > 0, for which (28) is satisfied. 5 5 My belated appreciation of the crucial importance of the distinction between R and R ι in this context is due largely to Martin Hellwig. An alternative approach for avoiding the difficulty is to guarantee that financial equilibrium occurs (or "usually" occurs) at spot prices p ∈ P such that r(p) ∈ R ι . See, in particular, the very interesting initial analysis developed, following this path, by McManus [9] (for the polar case ι = σ).
where, as in the text,
Furthermore, based on (A1), we also have a general version of Lemma 1 (which reduces to the same thing for the special case in which (2) is satisfied, and thus necessarily ι 0 = ι). Then the hypothesis (A1) is equivalent to the property that
while the relationship between a cone and its dual entails that W = {w : w ∈ R σ+1 and wψ 5 0 for ψ ∈ Ψ}.
It can therefore be easily seen that (i) There is ψ ∈ Ψ such that ψ À 0, i.e., there are ψ 0 > 0 and ψ s > 0 for s ∈ S such that − ψ 0 X i∈I 0
Suppose otherwise, i.e., Ψ ∩ R σ+1 ++ = ∅. Then, since the dual Ψ is also convex, by the separating hyperplane theorem there is w 6 = 0 such that wψ 5 wψ 0 for ψ ∈ Ψ, ψ 0 ∈ R σ+1 + , or w > 0 such that wψ 5 0 for ψ ∈ Ψ,
